This is Clive Harrison‘s second update to his spreadsheet-based pandemic model. The original model was posted on this blog on April 22 and the first update was posted on May 4.


The disease was spreading too quickly in my updated model. The proportion of asymptomatics is not as high as I believed the Swedish data was suggesting. The problem was/is that the numbers of deaths for the final 14 days or so of each edition of the published data are incomplete, so are revised upwards in subsequent editions with data arriving from the regions. That meant that the rapid fall in the death rate after a peak the data seemed to show when I last wrote was just artefact of the data collection system. You can see this in the attached worksheet, in the two charts below the Sweden data in “Common and calibration data”.

I followed this for a few weeks to see how the process works and then, this week, I felt I could make a reasonable estimate the adjustments that will take place over the next few weeks to obtain a sensible set of calibration data. It is clear that my model cannot replicate the smooth and prolonged log-linear decline in the actual numbers of daily deaths in the latest data using the numbers of cases implied by the very low mortality rates I was using last time.

To match the latest data I reduced the number of cases by increasing the mortality rate. The model started to approach a calibration at a mortality rate of 0.1%. I also looked again at the actions the Swedish authorities took in March. These included limits on meeting sizes and some distancing restrictions and recommendations in mid-March tightened somewhat at the end of March. You can see from the data that, contrary to popular belief, the Swedes and their government have been very effective at limiting the rate of spread, apart from a blip in care homes for the elderly that was quickly dealt with.

I used a second distancing phase match the tightening of the distancing measures in late March, which shows in the data, and tried calibrating the model for mortality rates of 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.4% and 0.5%. The rates above 0.1% do a better job of modelling the log-linear decline in the numbers of deaths, but the higher mortality rates require increasingly long doubling times. I think that rates of 0.2%, 0.3% and 0.4% give the best calibration results. 

I kept the second distancing rate going until daily deaths fell to zero but then I always end up with a big ‘second wave’, sometimes months later. I introduced a third distancing phase to deal with this and experimented with that for mortality rates of 0.15%, 0.2% and 0.25% (which seemed to give the best calibrations). Fine-tuning this third distancing phase eliminates a ‘second wave’ altogether and shows that the final death toll is very sensitive to its timing and intensity. 

If you have the time, it is worth playing with the four variables that control the third phase (in cells AF5, AD8, AF8 and AD9), while keeping the calibration values for the first and second distancing periods unchanged, and seeing how the final death toll (in cell G51, under the chart) responds. In the model, it seems that the best policy, to minimise the overall number of deaths, would be an immediate and controlled relaxation of distancing. This leads to a temporary increase in the number of daily deaths but an earlier end to the epidemic. In Sweden the second peak is below the first one, so would not over-stretch the medical resources, but that is unlikely to be the case in countries with much larger populations.

Death is a tricky subject. The increase in life expectancy in most places since 1945 is one of the many benefits of the global civilisation that has taken root since then and is currently being tested by this epidemic (among other things). Most people now die when they are old, which necessarily also means that most people who die are old. Some day, something, little or large, will tip each of us over the edge and into oblivion. At the moment COVID-19 is one of those things and wrinklies like me naturally make up the majority of the casualties. This is no excuse for negligence or disregard for the welfare and treatment of the elderly, but it’s not a reason for a lot of hand-wringing either.

The data seems to show that most Swedes have responded very effectively. Apparently traffic reduced immediately as people took fewer journeys and various other statistics show that responsible self-restraint has worked very well. I see that that there is now some internal dissent there because their death rate is much higher than in Norway and Denmark, where stricter measures were introduced. I think that the difference comes from Sweden being much closer to an end of the epidemic than their neighbours and that the final death tolls are probably a year away. When those numbers finally emerge they will probably be explained by demographic differences and the incidence of co-morbidity factors in the general population. 

I hope that the Swedish government sticks to its guns and treats its people like the responsible citizens they seem to be, as an example to almost all the other governments in the western world.


Download the updated model here.

Water utilities are critical for fighting COVID-19

In the absence of a vaccine or treatment for COVID-19, there is no better cure than prevention. Access to water, especially for hand-washing, (along with social distancing) is proven to be the most important method in preventing the spread of the pandemic, particularly in high density, low income communities. Keeping the taps running at this critical juncture, and expanding access to safe water, can save perhaps millions of lives as the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic unfolds.

But the effects of COVID-19 are making it difficult for water utilities to continue operations

At this time, when the sustainability and resilience of water service provision is paramount to the COVID-19 response, water utilities are finding it increasingly difficult to cover their costs. This is caused by the double burden of increased costs and decreased revenues. In many instances, costs are increasing due to pandemic-related operational costs like personal protective equipment and workplace adjustments; and government-mandated obligations like the expanded provision of public standpipes, water tankers, and hand-washing facilities. At the same time, revenue collection is falling due to a drop in industrial demand and the inability of household customers to pay their bills. Indicative information from World Bank client countries shows that the financial crisis has already reached many water utilities and that the impact on revenues is dramatic. Some figures indicate that revenue collected could have decreased by as much as 70% in the first few weeks of the pandemic. This dramatic drop in revenues could cause catastrophic declines in service, especially because most utilities in developing countries do not have cash reserves to fall back on.

Under normal operating conditions, utilities use disconnection of service to ensure payment of bills. But, for understandable reasons, utilities are not using this tool now, because they are choosing not to or because they have been told not to by governments and regulators. US’s National Association of Clean Water Agencies estimated that the impact of suspending water shutoffs, restoring connections to delinquent accounts, and reductions in non-residential water will result in a US$12.5 billion loss in utility revenues across the country.

A Liquidity Facility could be the solution

Given the essential services provided by water utilities, national leaders need to prioritize getting money to water utilities. A Liquidity Facility could be the vehicle to achieve this.

  • What is it? A Liquidity Facility is an entity or instrument to channel funds to water utilities to enable them to provide essential services
  • How would it work? In most cases, the national government[1] would first need to find a source of finance (examples include their own-source revenues, government commercial borrowing, government proceeds from the IMF, government borrowing from international development banks). The money would then flow from the national government to the Facility (often through their Ministry of Finance). Finally, the money would flow from the Facility to the utilities
  • How could this solve the problem? This could solve the problem because the Facility would be able to pay out a large amount of money fairly quickly to utilities
  • When would it be appropriate? A Facility would be most appropriate in countries with many water utilities. For a country with one national water utility a solution tailored to that utility, rather than a Facility serving multiple utilities, could be more appropriate .

The detailed design of the facility will take many different forms, depending on the local context. To set up a liquidity facility, the designer of the facility needs to answer a set of questions, including:

  • What is the scale of financing required?
  • Where is the money going to come from?
  • Who should manage the Facility?
  • What should be the modality of disbursement?

Several development agencies are currently working on these questions with governments in several countries. The issues described above must urgently be addressed so that water utilities can deliver and expand services during the COVID-19 crisis. We encourage all policy makers, utilities, international finance institutions, donors,  NGOs, and other water sector stakeholders to begin the discussion to answer these questions now.

Thank you!

To all of our readers who work at utilities, thank you for your continued public service in the face of COVID-19 risks and implications. We, at Castalia, are proud to call you our valued partners and we are energized to support and work in solidarity with you during this difficult time.

Please let us know how we can help, including if you need assistance related to this topic (such as advising on the development of the argument to advocate for the prioritization of water sector funding; or on the design of the liquidity facility).

[1] Note that we say, “In most cases, the national government would first need to find a source of finance” because there are cases where water utilities in developing countries are able to access commercial finance. In these cases, a Facility would not be needed. However, in most developing countries, water utilities are not commercially viable. Therefore, the national government will be required to provide the money that will keep them operational.

Authors: Lisa Nations and Shannon Riley.

[This post first appeared on World Bank Blogs on June 3.]

A recent blog by Stéphane Hallegatte and Stephen Hammer has already generated debate about how to undertake pandemic recovery stimulus packages in ways that support ongoing momentum toward a decarbonized world. This piece builds on that analysis, focusing on the role of the power sector.

Governments failed to anticipate how to prepare their economies and public health systems to weather a storm like the coronavirus (COVID-19). As such, the cost of the crisis and the subsequent recovery is enormous. We had in effect to stop the global economy so that health systems could cope. It is crucial not to fail again, whether to avert the next pandemic or the “mother of all crises” posed by climate change.

It’s well understood that the impending, massive fiscal stimulus packages will be an opportunity amounting to trillions of dollars. If this chance to avert the climate crisis is missed, it may never come again. But how best to seize the opportunity? What are the lessons from recent years of rapid progress in clean energy, that could help shape recovery packages? 

Here are important lessons in four key areas:

  • Policies for clean energy. Supportive policies have achieved a lot in spreading deployment of clean energy, reducing unit costs through global economies of scale and accelerating the learning curve. Policies have included, for example, the use of auctions for clean energy procurement to minimize the need for subsidies.  The next phase of reforms might focus on ensuring that market structures and regulations provide remuneration for investments in energy storage, to offset the variability of solar and wind.
  • Costs of clean energy. Another key lesson is that the sooner a clean technology can graduate from needing subsidies, the better. There have been too many examples of subsidies being suspended during fiscal crises, making investors not want to rely on them indefinitely. One important difference in the situation today, versus recovery after the 2008 global financial crisis, is that there are now cost-competitive renewable energy technologies. Subsidies should be refocused on the technologies that are new and promising, and that can take decarbonization to a new level (e.g., flexible power solutions, such as demand responsiveness or energy storage). 
  • Security of energy supply. Variable renewable energy can replace fossil fuels up to certain level of penetration in a power system, but it will eventually reach a limit, affecting the security of electricity supply. At that point, flexible power solutions need to be in place to enable cheap variable renewables to continue to penetrate the system.
  • Financing for clean energy. Experience shows that early investments in clean energy technologies need financing that is on less than commercial terms, to enable a demonstration and replication effect. That is precisely what the special funding mechanisms I describe below are for.  They are particularly useful when it is possible to involve private investment and support it with a blend of commercial and concessional finance.

So, drawing on these lessons, here is a suggested solution, in which the World Bank Group and Climate Investment Funds could provide leadership: 

  • Governments could use quick-disbursing development policy operations (DPOs) from the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) to support policy reforms that enable clean energy investments to be a key component of economic recovery. Countries’ National Determined Contributions (NDCs) would in many cases provide a “ready-made” policy framework.
  • Investors could start preparing investment projects for support, when “shovel-ready”, from the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) and Green Climate Fund (GCF). These investments could be an important component of fiscal stimulus packages, creating income and employment directly, while also helping provide the cheap energy needed to drive economic recovery.
  • Donors could ensure that climate action constitutes an important part of the development financing from MDBs for the COVID-19 recovery effort. This would require that resources in the CIFs and GCF scale up proportionately to the development financing effort from MDBs. Donor decisions about this need to start being made, and they would greatly facilitate the preparatory international discussions leading up to the UK-hosted COP26 climate negotiations next year. This may be how Glasgow succeeds where Madrid did not.

So, we should scale up DPOs now based on countries’ NDCs, get investment projects shovel-ready, and replenish the CIFs and GCF on a scale commensurate with the size of the challenge. With these approaches, much could be achieved towards averting the next crisis. It’s only really a matter of the political will to do it, and the insight to recognize that not doing so invites catastrophe. The pandemic makes clear that we must be visionary in our planning if want to reduce our vulnerability to future shocks.

About the Author: Jonathan Walters is a Senior Advisor at Castalia. 

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WASHINGTON, DC
+1 (202) 466-6790
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 1200
United States of America

SYDNEY
+61 (2) 9231 6862
Suite 19.01, Level 19, 227 Elizabeth Street
Australia

AUCKLAND
+64 (4) 913 2800
74D France Street, Newton South
New Zealand

WELLINGTON
+64 (4) 913 2800
Level 2, 88 The Terrace
New Zealand

PARIS
+33 (1) 73 44 26 97
6 Rue Duret
France

BOGOTÁ
+57 (1) 508 5794
Calle 81 #11-08, Piso 5, Oficina 5-127
Colombia

Thinking for a better world.

Castalia-logo-negative-2col
PROJECTS        NEWS        BLOG        CONTACT
© Copyright 2019 Castalia. All rights reserved.
Terms | Privacy | Credits | Sitemap